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Abstract
How do people respond to matched-savings incentives? Studies of 401(k) plans find that
matching increases participation but that higher match rates do not increase—and may
decrease—the level of savings. This paper analyzes saving by low-income people in
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), a new savings incentive that matches
withdrawals if used for home purchase, post-secondary education, or self-employment.
The model controls for several sources of bias common in estimates of match-rate
effects: unobserved heterogeneity among firms and among participants, censoring of
savings at the match cap, and an inverse relationship between match rates and match
caps. In IDAs, higher match rates are associated with an increased probability of
continued participation but also with a decreased level of savings.
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1. Introduction
The federal government spends billions each year on tax breaks for Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans. These incentives, however, are weak for
low-income people in low tax brackets. Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are a
new savings incentive targeted to the poor (Sherraden, 1991). IDAs provide matches on
withdrawals for home purchase, post-secondary education, or self-employment. How do
people respond to the increased rate of return in this matched-savings structure?
For the level of savings, theory is ambiguous; the substitution effect and the
income effect work against each other. For participation, the income effect vanishes, so
higher rates of return should increase participation.
Empirical research takes two tacks. The first looks at the use of 401(k) plans
and/or IRAs and total savings. Perhaps one-third of contributions is new savings due
to incentives, with the strongest effects for low-income people (Engen and Gale, 2000;
Bernheim, 1997; Hubbard and Skinner, 1996). Conclusive measurement has been
thwarted by a lack of data on all assets and debts for people with exogenous differences
in access to savings incentives.
The second tack looks at rates of return for specific types of savings. The
empirical record suggests that household savings does not respond much (if at all) to
the rate of return, perhaps because much saving is precautionary (Bernheim, 1999;2
Deaton, 1992). Although the data preclude conclusive measurement, again effects seem
strongest for poor people (VanDerhei, Copeland, and Quick, 2000).
This paper takes this second tack; it looks at rates of return (match rates) and a
specific type of savings (IDAs). It avoids some (but not all) of the technical weaknesses
of past work on 401(k) plans.
Higher match rates are associated with an increased likelihood of continued
participation in IDAs. If the goal is to include more poor people in savings incentives,
then higher match rates worked. A higher match rate, however, was also linked with
decreased savings. This decrease might be real (income effects or target-saving effects)
or apparent (endogeneity of match rates and saving capacity). If the decrease was real
and if the goal was to boost aggregate personal savings, then higher match rates for
IDAs did not work; decreased savings more than offset increased participation. Even
though higher match rates decreased savings, they still boosted asset accumulation
(savings plus match). Thus, they may have facilitated the purchase of a big-ticket item
that might have led to discrete improvements in long-term well-being and capacity.
Section 2 describes IDAs. Section 3 reviews the measurement of match-rate
effects in the presence of match caps, endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and
censoring. Section 4 presents the data, model, and results, and Section 5 discusses
potential policy implications.3
2. Individual Development Accounts
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) are matched-savings structures for the
poor. Withdrawals from IDAs are matched if used for home purchase, post-secondary
education, or self-employment. Participants also receive financial education and support
from peers and program staff. IDAs aim to include the poor in savings incentives, to
increase savings by the poor, and to boost ownership by the poor.
Sherraden (1988) proposed IDAs. The concept of asset-based policy has since
gained intellectual momentum (Shapiro and Wolfe, 2001; Ackerman and Alstott, 1999;
Conley, 1999; Stoesz and Saunders, 1999; Oliver and Shapiro, 1995). It has also
attracted broad political support. For example, IDAs are part of policy in most states,
and Bill Clinton proposed national IDA-like accounts. Both George W. Bush and Al
Gore had IDA proposals in their platforms, and a current bill (the Savings for Working
Families Act) would budget up to $10 billion for IDAs. The government of Canada will
sponsor an IDA demonstration in ten cities, and the government of the United Kingdom
has proposed IDA-like accounts.
IDAs are unique in that they are aimed at the poor, they subsidize non-
retirement savings, and they provide an explicit match. The rest of this section
compares and contrasts IDAs with Roth IRAs and 401(k) plans, two other common
matched-savings structures (Table 1, non-Roth IRAs are omitted to save space).1 Matches from employers in 401(k) plans are not subsidies but part of compensation.
2 The Internal Revenue Service has not yet ruled on the tax status of IDA matches.
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Eligibility for IDAs is income-tested. Like Roth IRAs (which have universal
eligibility), deposits are supposed to come from earned income. Unlike 401(k) plans,
access and eligibility to IDAs are not provided through an employer.
Roth IRAs and 401(k) plans provide matches indirectly via tax breaks. Tax
deductions are worth little to poor people, so IDAs make direct matches. Matches in
IDAs are typically much higher than in 401(k) plans or Roth IRAs. Funds for IDA
matches and administrative expenses may come from private or public sources, whereas
the government pays for matches in Roth IRAs and 401(k) plans.
1 Savers bear
administrative expenses for Roth IRAs, and employers bear them for 401(k) plans.
IDAs are held in standard passbook savings accounts in banks, whereas Roth
IRAs and 401(k) plans are held in restricted-access accounts, often in mutual funds.
IDA deposits may be withdrawn at will and come from after-tax dollars (like Roth
IRAs but unlike 401(k) plans) and earnings are taxed (unlike Roth IRAs or 401(k)
plans).
2 Withdrawals from IDAs for purposes other than home purchase, post-secondary
education, or self-employment are not matched but are not otherwise penalized; early
distributions from Roth IRAs are subject to an excise tax, and early distributions from
401(k) plans are subject to income tax as well as an excise tax.3 IDAs and their subsidies for savings for asset purchases in the near term resemble a
program that subsidized savings for a down payment on a home in Canada from 1974
to 1985. Unlike IDAs, the Canadian program matched through tax breaks, so most
participants were in high tax brackets (Engelhardt, 1996).
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IDAs—unlike Roth IRAs and 401(k) plans—are meant primarily for pre-
retirement asset purchases rather than retirement consumption. This is the aspect in
which IDAs differ most from Roth IRAs and 401(k) plans.
3
IDA programs (so far at least) are administered by not-for-profit organizations.
The not-for-profit sets the match cap, which may be annual or for a span beyond one
year. In contrast, 401(k) plans are sponsored by employers and have annual match caps
set by the employer and/or by law. Roth IRAs are administered by financial-service
organizations and have annual match caps set by law. Payroll deduction is required for
401(k) plans and is possible—but not required—for IDAs and Roth IRAs. Finally,
financial education is required in IDAs but is voluntary (if available) in 401(k) plans
and Roth IRAs.4 Clancy (1996) does not explicitly say whether individual or firm data were used.
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3. Measurement of match-rate effects
The ideal test of the effects of match rates would measure participation, savings,
and all personal and program characteristics for people with exogenous differences in
match rates. No study (including this one) achieves the ideal. This section reviews past
work and argues that their estimates of match-rate effects are biased because they fail
to control for match caps, censoring, endogeneity, and unobserved heterogeneity.
3.1 Research on matched savings in 401(k) plans
3.1.1 The first studies
Early studies of match rates use firm-level data. GAO (1988, cited in Poterba,
Venti, and Wise, 1994) tabulates participation and savings by match rate and find that
both outcomes increase with the presence of a match (perhaps at a decreasing rate) and
with the match rate. Neither study uses statistics nor controls for variables that might
cause spurious correlations between the match rate, participation, and/or savings.
Three other early studies use statistics with firm-level data. Correlation analysis
of employees who earned $32,000 a year or less at 24 firms in 1995 showed that
participation (but not savings) increased with the match rate (Clancy, 1996).
4 Papke,
Petersen, and Poterba (1996) and Papke and Poterba (1995) use regressions with one
to five control variables from a 1987 survey of 43 firms. Both studies find that5 The results are weakened because match rates are imputed from Form 5500 data.
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participation increases with matching. Papke and Poterba (1995) also find that higher
match rates—once there is a match—are not linked with savings.
These early studies point in one direction, but they use small samples, simple
methods, and firm-level data that may mask individual behavior. A second set of
studies uses larger samples, more control variables, and sometimes data on individuals.
3.1.2 Second-generation research
Papke (1995) uses pooled regressions with panel data on 3,565 to 5,363 firms
from 1985-1987.
5 With higher match rates, participation increases (at a decreasing
rate), and savings increase (at very low match rates) and then decrease. The effects on
diminish or vanish with controls for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.
Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (1996) use a panel of 1,100 firms in 1993-94. In
pooled regressions with nine control variables, the presence of a match is linked both
with increased participation and increased savings. Again, the effects shrink or vanish
with controls for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. 
Andrews (1992) regresses participation and savings on the presence of a match
and on eleven other variables for 3,884 individuals from the May 1988 Employee
Benefit Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Matching is associated
with increased participation but with decreased savings.8
Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998) use the April 1993 CPS. Regression with
eight controls suggests that participation increases in the presence of a match but that
the level of the match rate does not matter. They also show simple tabulations in which
contribution rates decrease as match rates increase.
Clark and Schieber (1998) use regressions with five controls for 60,919 people at
19 firms in 1994. Higher match rates increase both participation and contributions.
Clark et al. (2000) use similar data for 156,376 people at 87 firms in 1995. They find
that higher matches increase participation but decrease contributions.
Munnell, Sundén, and Taylor (2000) use the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). In a regression with 8 controls and 1,232 participants, matching is linked with
increased savings but, higher match rates are linked with decreased savings.
Like early studies, this second generation finds that the presence of a match
increases participation. With their improved data and technique, however, some find
that higher match rates do not increase—and may decrease—the level of savings.
3.1.3 Third-generation research
The best, most-recent studies use individual data, control for moderate numbers
of other variables, and account for match caps and/or possible endogeneity of match
rates with unconditional savings. On the whole, they still find that a match increases
participation, but some also find that higher match rates may decrease savings.9
Even and Macpherson (2001) use 1993 CPS data and control for 18 variables
and for the chance that firms with unconditionally low savers are more likely to
introduce matching (or to increase the match rate) to boost participation and savings.
Such endogeneity—if it exists—would tend to mask any positive effects of matching.
They find much larger match-rate effects on participation than in previous studies.
VanDerhei, Copeland, and Quick (2000) use the best data yet: characteristics for
137 plans and their 163,346 participants. Besides age, wage, and tenure, they control
for the match cap (although they do not interact it with the match rate). They find
that higher match rates are linked with decreased savings and that higher match caps
are linked with increased savings. This suggests, for example, that a total potential
match of 4 percent of salary would elicit more savings as a 50-percent match rate on up
to 8 percent of salary than as a 100-percent match rate on up to 4 percent of salary.
3.1.4 Summary
The best work on 401(k) plans suggests that the presence of a match increases
participation. Once there is a match, participation increases at a decreasing rate.
Higher match rates do not increase savings and may even decrease it.
That the presence of a match should increase participation and savings is not a
surprise; only the substitution effect is at work. That higher match rates would decrease
savings is theoretically possible—the result of income effects or target-saving—but is
still somewhat of a surprise. The negative effect, however, may reflect bias from failure6 In a 401(k) plan, the match rate is the number of dollars from the employer for each
dollar from the employee. Tax breaks for 401(k) plans are equivalent to matches, even
though they are not put in 401(k) plans. In this sense, research on 401(k) plans that
ignore tax breaks understate the match rate. This study also ignores taxes, but most
IDA participants are in low tax brackets; only people with income under 200 percent of
poverty qualified for ADD, and the median participant was at the poverty line.
7 401(k) plans have up to two match caps. The employer matches contributions up to
the employer-match cap, and the government gives tax breaks on contributions up to
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to control for censoring, endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and/or the negative
correlation between match rates and match caps.
3.2 Match caps
To show how match caps may affect estimates of match-rate effects, Figure 1
depicts budget sets for a person with an IDA. On the horizontal axis, savings increase
from left to right, and consumption increases from right to left. The vertical axis shows
asset accumulation (savings plus match). Utility increases to the northwest.
3.2.1 Match rates and match caps
In an IDA, the match rate is the number of dollars disbursed to a vendor for
each dollar withdrawn by the participant for a matchable purchase.
6 In Figure 1, the
match rate is the slope of the budget line minus unity, that is, 0:1 for OC, 0.5:1 for
OA, and 1:1 for OB.
Match caps are limits on matchable deposits. IDAs cap the number of matchable
dollars, although participants are free to put non-matchable dollars in the same
passbook savings account.
7 In Figure 1, D is a match cap.the IRS match cap. Furthermore, specific plans may limit contributions at some point
beyond the employer-match cap but before the IRS-match cap. Employer caps limit
salary-deferral percentages, and IRS caps limit numbers of dollars.
8 Bernheim and Scholz (1993) suggest that target-saving predominates for poor people.
11
Potential match  Match cap  Match rate. (1)
Potential asset accumulation  Match cap  Potential match,
 Match cap  (Match cap  Match rate),
 Match cap  (1  Match rate).
(2)
3.2.2 Potential matches and potential asset accumulation
The potential match is the product of the match cap and the match rate:
 In Figure 1, the potential match (match rate 0.5:1, match cap D) is AE. A
given potential match may result from a range of pairs of match rates and match caps.
For example, a $500 potential match may result from a 0.5:1 match rate with a $1,000
match cap or from a 1:1 match rate with a $500 match cap. In 401(k) plans, match
rates and match caps are negatively correlated (VanDerhei, Copeland, and Quick, 2000;
Clancy, 1996; Papke, Petersen, and Poterba, 1996).
Potential asset accumulation is the match cap plus the potential match:
 In Figure 1, potential asset accumulation with a match rate of 0.5:1 and a
match cap of D is AD. Potential asset accumulation especially matters for target-
savers. IDA participants plan to purchase a big-ticket item and so may be particularly
likely to target-save,
8 but many retirement savers also target-save (Bernheim, 1999).12
Together, match rates and match caps determine the potential match and
potential asset accumulation. Theory predicts two types of effects on participation and
savings due to changes in match rates and/or match caps: economic effects
(substitution and/or income), and behavioral effects.
3.2.3 Economic effects
The economic theory of matched-savings structures discussed below highlights
that the analysis of match-rate effects must control for variation in match caps.
3.2.3.1 Participation
Participation is all-or-none, so match rates exert only substitution effects. For
the example of a match rate of 0:1 (budget OC in Figure 1), the northwest-most
indifference curve (I0) is tangent to the budget at O; the person does not participate.
As the match rate increases and the budget rotates up and left (first to 0.5:1 for OAF
and then to 1:1 for OBG), the likelihood that the tangency will move off O (say, to I1
or I2) increases. Thus, higher match rates can only increase participation.
The match cap has no economic effects on participation. A shift from D to D´
(and the 0.5:1 budget from OAF to OHJ) does not change the slope near O, and
quasi-concave utility implies that no tangencies on HJ give greater utility than at O.
3.2.3.2 Level of savings
The economic effects of changes in match rates (and/or changes in match caps)
depend both on the match cap and on whether savings are at the match cap.9 If the indifference curve is exactly tangent to the budget at the original match
cap—and this is unlikely—then a higher match cap will not increase savings.
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If savings are not at the match cap (say, at I1 with a match rate of 0.5:1 on
budget OAF), then an increase in the match rate has both income and substitution
effects; either could dominate. For example, a move to a match rate of 1:1 on budget
OBG could lead to tangency at I2 (decreased savings) or at I3 (increased savings).
If savings are not at the match cap, then the match cap has no economic effect.
For example, with tangency at I1 with a 0.5:1 match rate and a match cap of D, a shift
to a match cap of D´ (budget OAF to OHJ) leaves the optimal choice unchanged.
If savings are at the match cap (for example, I4 on budget OAF with a 0.5:1
match rate and a match cap of D), then a higher match rate has only an income effect.
Savings may decrease (for example, to I2) or stay the same (I3).
If savings are at the match cap (say, I4 at D on budget OAF), then a higher
cap (D´ on budget OHJ) will increase savings (for example, to I5 or I6).
9
3.2.3.3 How the match cap may confound estimates of match-rate effects
The theory above looks at changes in either match rates or match caps, with the
other held constant. In 401(k) plans in practice, however, high match rates go with low
match caps (and inversely). If estimates of match-rate effects do not hold match caps
constant, then higher match rates may seem to decrease savings even if they really
increase savings.10 This bias affects all who would save more at the lower match rate (0.5:1) and higher
match cap (D´) than at the lower match cap (D) and higher match rate (1:1). The
bias also affects all who, at the higher match rate (1:1), save up to the lower match cap
(D). In practice, many participants save at the match cap, so the bias could be large.
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For example, suppose that an increase in the match rate from 0.5:1 to 1:1 (with
the match cap of D´ held constant) would increase saving from I6 to I7 (Figure 1). If,
however, the higher match rate comes with a lower match cap D, then matched savings
must decrease, say from I6 to I3. Failure to control for the match cap would show
(incorrectly) that higher match rates decrease savings.
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Estimates of match-rate effects should control for the match cap. Only
VanDerhei, Copeland, and Quick (2000) have done so. Estimates of the effects of match
rates on savings in other studies are biased downwards, perhaps severely. 
3.2.4 Behavioral effects
Match rates and match caps can have behavioral effects because people lack
total rationality, complete information, and perfect imagination. The costs of decision-
making often lead to choices based on habit, culture, rules of thumb, or what public
policy seems to suggest. Saving may be particularly subject to these behavioral effects
(Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Caskey, 1997; Thaler, 1994; Sherraden, 1991; Maital,
1986), in part because costs are swift and sure but rewards are distant and uncertain,
and in part because people differ in how well they grasp the math of finance.15
Furthermore, the human body evolved in a context of extreme scarcity and so may
have a bias for short-term gratification even at the expense of long-term well-being.
Bernheim (1999) discusses how the behavioral effects of savings incentives may
increase savings. Foremost, people may take the mere existence of incentives—be they
IDAs, IRAs, or 401(k) plans—as a suggestion that they can and should save. Likewise,
the existence of a match signals that saving is a good idea; without much in the way of
a personal benefit-cost analysis, people may assume that they would be fools not to
take advantage of “free money”. Furthermore, restrictions on the use of matched
savings may highlight goals (such as home ownership, college education, or retirement
security) that people might not focus on otherwise. People may also regard matched
savings (even if fully liquid, as in IDAs) as “off limits”, and this curbs temptations to
consume. Finally, people may turn match caps into goals and so may try to save more
if match caps are higher. In sum, behavioral theory predicts greater participation and
greater savings with higher match rates and with higher match caps.
Can behavioral effects be distinguished from economic effects? Only economic
(income) effects can explain decreases in participation and savings. If savings and/or
participation increase with higher match rates, however, the cause could be behavioral
or economic (substitution). The only sharp test involves changes in the match cap.
Economic theory predicts no effect on participation (nor savings, if not at the match16
cap), but behavioral theory predicts changes in both participation and savings. Studies
on 401(k) plans have not distinguished between behavioral and economic effects.
3.3 Endogeneity
In 401(k) plans, match rates may depend on unconditional savings in two ways.
On the one hand, high savers may demand high match rates. On the other hand, firms
with low savers may introduce matching or boost match rates to fulfill non-
discrimination requirements. Estimates of match-rate effects are biased upwards by the
first type of endogeneity and downwards by the second type.
Only one paper convincingly controls for endogeneity. Even and Macpherson
(2001) find that firms do add matching or raise match rates in response to low
participation and/or low savings. Thus, estimates of match-rate effects that do not
account for endogeneity may be biased downwards.
3.4 Unobserved heterogeneity
Unobserved characteristics of firms or participants may be correlated both with
savings and with match rates. This unobserved heterogeneity could bias estimates of
match-rate effects either upwards or downwards.
The few studies of 401(k) plans that do deal with unobserved heterogeneity find
that firm-level controls weaken otherwise-positive associations between match rates and
participation and savings (Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz, 1996; Papke, Petersen, and
Poterba, 1996; Papke, 1995). No studies control for participant-level heterogeneity.11 Match caps censor desired savings, but the need to control for match caps is distinct
from the need to control for censoring. Controlling for censoring is also distinct from
controlling for kinks. Kinks affect estimates of the effects of matched-savings structures
on total savings (Moffitt, 1990); this paper—and the 401(k) literature—look only at
effects on matched savings.
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3.5 Censoring
Even if desired savings responds to changes in match rates, actual savings may
change little or not at all, due to the match cap. Estimates of match-rate effects that do
not control for this censoring are attenuated toward zero.
For example, suppose that desired savings with a $500 match cap and a 1:1
match rate is $450. With a 2:1 match rate, desired savings may exceed the $500 cap.
Actual savings, however, is capped at $500, so the effect on actual savings is smaller
than the effect on desired savings.
This paper asks about effects on desired savings. This is the appropriate
question for counterfactual policy analysis. Given changes in desired savings, changes in
actual savings, given a specific match cap, are straightforward to compute. 
How often do desired and actual savings diverge? In studies of specific 401(k)
plans, Kusko, Papke, and Poterba (1998) and Yakoboski and VanDerhei (1996) find
that about 20-30 percent of participants saved up to the highest match cap. In the
IDAs studied here, 26 percent of continuing participants were at the match cap. Thus,
bias in match-rate effects that do not control for censoring may be large.
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3.6 Summary
Estimates of the effects of match rates should control for bias due to negative
correlations between match caps and match rates, censoring, endogeneity, and
unobserved heterogeneity among programs and among participants. No estimate in the
401(k) literature controls for more than one of these five possible sources of bias. This
paper (below) controls for four of them.19
4. Data, model, and results
The analysis here controls for match caps and for a wide range of characteristics
of programs and participants. It also addresses censoring and unobserved heterogeneity,
but not endogeneity. For IDAs examined here, higher match rates were associated with
increased continued participation but with decreased savings.
4.1 Data from the American Dream Demonstration
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) comprises 14 IDA programs across
the United States. Enrollment started in July 1997, and 2,378 participants had opened
an IDA by June 30, 2000 (Schreiner et al., 2001).
Data on programs and participants in ADD come from management-information
software used by programs (Johnson, Hinterlong, and Sherraden, 2001). The system
records account-structure parameters, demographic and socio-economic data on
participants, and monthly IDA cash flows. The cash-flow data are accurate and
complete; they come from bank records, satisfy accounting identities, and were
extensively cross-checked. It may be the best (or only) high-frequency data on matched
savings by the poor.
4.1.1 Type of match-cap structure
Participants in ADD face either annual or lifetime match caps. Annual match
caps limit matchable dollars in a participation year. Lifetime match caps limit total
matchable dollars over a span of multiple years.12 In practice, imperfect rationality may make match-rate effects stronger for continuing
participation than for participation. Although opportunity costs are the same for exit
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Of the 2,378 participants in ADD, this paper analyzes the 807 who had an
annual match cap and who exited before the end of their first year or who completed at
least 12 months as of June 30, 2000. Participants are analyzed just after their twelfth
month for two reasons. First, like all other permanent-access matched-savings
structures, any permanent-access IDA would have an annual match cap, in part to
prevent abuse. Second, some participants in IDAs—as in IRAs—make large deposits
just before the deadline. Figure 2 shows that net deposits in ADD spike at year-end.
Measuring IDA savings before an annual or lifetime deadline would be like measuring
IRA savings in October even though most IRA deposits for a tax year are made before
April 15 in the next calender year.
4.1.2 Continued participation
There are no data on eligible people who choose not to participate in ADD, so
this paper cannot look at the effects of match rates on participation. Instead, it looks at
effects on continued participation through month 12 after enrollment. The opposite of
continued participation is exit, that is, leaving ADD without a matched withdrawal.
In theory, continued participation is analogous to participation; just as a non-
participant can enroll at any time, a participant can exit at any time. Opportunity
costs are the same for exit as for non-participation; factors that increase (decrease)
participation should also increase (decrease) continued participation.
12and for non-participation, participants may “feel” exit costs more than non-participants
because participants are more likely to know what they are missing.
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About 84 percent of participants continued participation through month 12
(Table 2). The share continuing was higher for match rates of 1:1 and 2:1 than for
match rates of 3:1. Theory cannot explain this, but the tabulations do not control for
other variables correlated both with continuing participation and with match rates.
4.1.3 Level of IDA savings
IDA savings are the smaller of the match cap or of deposits minus unmatched
withdrawals. Unlike research on 401(k) plans, this paper looks at savings in terms of
dollars rather than in terms of shares of income. This is because IDA match caps are in
terms of dollars and because income data in ADD are noisy.
Average net savings in the first 12 months were $379 (Table 2). Savings
decreased with the match rate: $411 for 1:1, $376 for 2:1, and $314 for 3:1. Again, the
tabulations do not control for other variables and so may not say much about match-
rate effects.
 Table 2 also shows that asset accumulation (savings plus match) averaged
$1,021 and increased with the match rate. IDA savings as a share of income averaged
3.0 percent and was highest for 3:1 match rates. On average, continuing participants
made deposits in two of three months.22
4.1.4 Variation in match caps and match rates
Match caps in ADD do not vary much (Table 3). This likely precludes reliable
estimates of match-cap effects.
Unlike match caps, match rates in ADD vary both between programs and within
programs both for continuing participants and for exited participants (Table 4). This
allows controls for both match rates and program-level unobserved heterogeneity.
4.1.5 Endogeneity
Two-way causation between the match rate and unconditional savings is the
main threat to validity in this study. Although participants could not choose among
IDA programs by their match rates (ADD was all there was), unconditional savings
may still be correlated with match rates in three ways.
First, programs often targeted specific groups, and they may have set higher
(lower) match rates if they expected to serve unconditionally low (high) savers
(Sherraden et al., 2000). This would bias the estimated match-rate effect downwards.
Second, Program 1 had a 1:1 match rate except for participants who received
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); their match rate was 2:1. If TANF
receipt was correlated with unobserved characteristics that affect unconditional savings,
then linking match rates with TANF produces endogeneity bias. For example, if TANF
recipients save less, all else constant, then this will bias estimated effects downwards.13 Schreiner et al. (2001) discuss the data from ADD at length.
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Third, Programs 7a and 7b gave a match rate of 2:1 to home buyers and 1:1 to
others. If home buyers were high savers, then the bias is upwards. If home buyers were
target-savers—for example, for a fixed down payment—then the bias is downwards.
The data provide no way to control for endogeneity where match rates depend
on expected savings. Dummies mark the receipt of public assistance and the intended
use of the IDA control for the other two types of endogeneity. These imperfect controls
are the best that the data allow. The paper returns to this issue below.
4.1.6 Data caveats
Of course, no data set is perfect, and four points are noted here.
13 First, the
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of participants are measured at
enrollment, but they may have changed afterwards. Second, despite a strong
commitment to evaluation by IDA staff, data quality varies among programs. Third,
participant income, assets, and debts are noisy and probably understated, as in most
surveys. Fourth, continued participation may be overstated because participants may
exit de facto even if the program has not marked them as exits.
4.2 Model
With data on a wide range of program and participant characteristics, this paper
uses a Tobit model with selection for continued participation to control for match caps,
censoring, and unobserved heterogeneity in programs and participants.24
z

i  wi  ui. (3)
y

i  xi  i. (4)
The first step is a Probit for continued participation. For person i, zi
* is the
desire to participate through month 12. Desire to continue is assumed to be a linear
function of a vector wi of independent variables and an error term ui:
The controls wi include a set of dummies for the match rate (with 1:1 omitted), a
single variable for the match cap, and a set of program dummies to control for
program-level heterogeneity. Appendix A describes other independent variables.
Desired continued participation zi
* is unobserved. Actual continued participation
di is observed, and it equals unity if zi
* is positive and zero otherwise.
The second step is a Tobit with savings censored at the match cap (31 percent of
continuing participants are censored, Table 2). In standard Heckman fashion, a
transformation of the error term from the first-step Probit becomes, in the second-step
Tobit, a control for unobserved individual heterogeneity that affects both the likelihood
of continued participation and the level of savings for continuing participants. Desired
savings yi
* is a linear function of independent variables xi and an error term i:25
Observed savings yi equals the smaller of desired savings yi
* or the match cap. As
in the first-step Probit, the controls xi include dummies for the match rate, a variable
for the match cap, and dummies to control for program-level unobserved heterogeneity,
as well as the transformed Probit error term to control for individual-level unobserved
heterogeneity. The error terms u and  are bivariate normal with correlation .
4.3 Results
Maximum-likelihood estimates for the Tobit model with sample selection are
presented below for the match cap and match rate. Other results are in Appendix A.
The estimated correlation  is positive, large (0.56), and statistically significant
(p = 0.01, Table A5). Unobserved characteristics that make a participant more likely to
continue participation also serve to increase desired savings.
4.3.1 Match caps
Consistent with economic theory (but not with behavioral theory), the match cap
was not associated with continued participation in IDAs in ADD (Table 5). An increase
in the match cap of $100 is estimated to decrease the likelihood of continued
participation by 0.04 percentage points, and the p-value of the coefficient is high (0.29).
Expected desired savings decreased by $74 for each $100 increase in the match
cap (Table 5). This puzzling effect is both large and statistically significant (p = 0.01).26
For two reasons, both of these results are probably peculiar to this data set.
First, match caps vary little, both between programs and within programs. Second,
neither economic nor behavioral theory can explain negative match-cap effects.
4.3.2 Match rates
Higher match rates for IDAs in ADD were associated with a greater likelihood of
continued participation. The estimated changes are 0.35 percentage points for the move
from 1:1 to 2:1 and 0.87 percentage points for the move from 1:1 to 3:1 (coefficient p-
values are 0.04, Table 5). These effects are small compared with the large changes in
the match rate. This paper cannot test for the importance of the presence of a match,
but perhaps continued participation in IDAs—as research has found for 401(k)
plans—depends more on the presence of a match than on the match rate.
Higher match rates decreased desired savings (Table 5). The move from 1:1 to
2:1 was associated with a reduction of $102 (p = 0.02). The move from 1:1 to 3:1 was
associated with a reduction of $232, but the coefficient was not statistically significant
(p = 0.59). In ADD, income and/or target-saving effects swamped substitution effects.
To recap, higher match rates increased participation a little and decreased
desired savings a lot.
4.3.3 Asset accumulation
Do higher match rates increase or decrease asset accumulation (savings plus
match)? In the absence of match caps and with a match rate of 1:1 for all continuing27
participants, predicted desired savings averages $518. With a 2:1 match rate, the
average is $416. Asset accumulation is then $1,036 at 1:1 and $1,248 at 2:1. Thus,
decreased savings would offset some—but not all—of the effects of a higher match rate
on asset accumulation.
In the presence of match caps, the offset is smaller because some of the decrease
in desired savings does not affect actual savings because it takes place above the caps.
For example, with a match rate of 1:1 for all continuing participants, average predicted
savings with the match caps in ADD is $468 (asset accumulation of $936); with a
match rate of 2:1, average predicted savings is $392 (asset accumulation of $1,176).
4.3.4 Bias in past estimates of match-rate effects
This paper addresses some sources of bias ignored in most research on 401(k)
plans. Did this care with match caps, censoring, and unobserved heterogeneity matter?
To check, a Tobit with sample selection was run without a variable for the
match cap. As might be expected—given that the match cap varies little in this
data—effects were unchanged, except the estimate for a 3:1 match rate on desired
savings fell to less than $1 (p = 0.92).
Without program dummies, results change drastically. Match rates of 2:1 no
longer affect participation, and match rates of 3:1 decrease participation. Desired
savings still falls (by $84) for match rates of 2:1 compared with 1:1, but it increases $4128
for match rates of 3:1 compared with 1:1 (p = 0.40). The results without controls for
program-level unobserved heterogeneity do not make much sense.
A Probit and a Tobit were run separately to check whether individual
heterogeneity mattered. Participation results were virtually unchanged. The desired-
savings regression, however, had match-rate effects of essentially zero. This is unlikely.
  Censoring also mattered. First-step results for a selection model with ordinary
least-squares in the second step (rather than a Tobit) were virtually unchanged. As
expected, match-rate effects on desired savings were attenuated toward zero, $74 for
2:1 match rates and $181 for 3:1 match rates.
Controls for match caps, censoring, and unobserved heterogeneity did matter,
especially for effects on desired savings. Although IDAs are not exactly like 401(k)
plans, the measurement issues are quite similar, so the usefulness of work on match-
rate effects in 401(k) plans that do not control for these sources of bias is unclear.
Finally, although the model here controls for many sources of bias, it cannot
control for all possible forms of endogeneity between match rates and unconditional
savings. This weakens the robustness of the results. IDA programs in ADD may have
set match rates higher (lower) if they expected participants to be low (high)
unconditional savers. This biases estimates of match-rate effects downwards, so the
estimated decrease in savings associated with higher match rates may be overstated.29
5. Discussion
For IDAs in ADD, higher match rates were linked with increased participation
but with decreased savings. Higher match rates may have income effects that swamp
substitution effects, and/or people with IDAs may target-save. Endogeneity between
the match rate and unconditional savings may also explain at least part of the effect.
What does this mean for policy? The response of savings to match rates matters
because of cost. The government spends billions each year on tax breaks for IRAs and
401(k) plans, and IDAs cost even more per dollar saved, both because of higher match
rates and because of higher administrative costs (Schreiner et al., 2001).
IDA policy might have three (not necessarily exclusive) goals. The first is to
include more poor people in savings incentives (Sherraden, 2001). For IDAs in ADD,
higher match rates increased participation and thus served this purpose.
A second goal is to increase aggregate personal savings. Given that the move
from 1:1 to 2:1 was linked with an increase in continued participation of less than 1
percentage point and with a decrease of $76 in actual savings and of $102 in desired
savings, higher match rates for IDAs in ADD did not serve this purpose.
The third goal is to increase asset accumulation by poor people who would not
likely take advantage of tax breaks for retirement savings. This matters in part because
ownership of big-ticket items (such as homes) may have broad social benefits and may
spark discrete improvements in the long-term well-being and capacity of their owners.30
Because matches turn smaller sums of savings into larger sums of asset accumulation,
IDAs may facilitate large purchases. All else constant for IDAs in ADD, higher match
rates were associated with higher (actual and predicted) asset accumulation.
The broad lesson for policy may be that participation responds to the presence of
a match much more than it responds to the level of the match rate. If the goal is to get
people to participate in savings incentives, then matching, even a very low rate, may be
very effective. As far as the level of savings is concerned, people may respond to higher
match rates—once past some still-unknown point—by saving less. Thus, if the goal is
to boost saving, perhaps a low match rate is best. For participation, low match rates
work as well as high ones; for savings, low match rates work better than high ones.
As a final note, the theory discussed in this paper suggests that the response to
matched-savings incentives depends on the interaction of match rates with match caps.
The match cap varied little in the data here, but a next step for future research is to
map savings for a range of combinations of match rates and match caps to give
policymakers and program designers a menu of trade-offs.31
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Appendix A: Variables and regression results
This appendix describes 25 independent variables in the Tobit model with
selection and discusses collateral results omitted from the main text.
A.1 Program characteristics
A.1.1 Financial education
Unlike IRAs and 401(k) plans, IDAs have mandatory financial education.
Education is omitted from the participation equation because exited participants,
perforce, have fewer chances to attend classes. The average continuing participant
attended 9 hours of class in the first year (Table A1). Each hour in the range of 1 to 6
increased savings by $29, and each hour from 7 to 12 increased savings by $32. The
effect leveled off after 12 hours. The large effect for people with zero hours likely reflects
programs’ letting sophisticated participants miss class.
A.1.2 Intended use
About 49 percent of continuing participants intended to use their IDA for home
purchase, 18 percent for post-secondary education, and 14 percent for self-employment.
Another 20 percent planned for home repair, job training, or retirement. Intended use
was omitted from the first step and had no effect on desired savings.
A.1.3 Program fixed effects
A set of dummies control for unobserved heterogeneity among programs.
Unobserved factors that vary across programs matter a lot (Table A1). Not all36
coefficients are statistically significant, but that depends in part on which program is
arbitrarily omitted, and most estimated coefficients are large in magnitude.
A.2 Program characteristics
Three-fourths of participants were female (Table A2). For all participants, the
average age was 36 years, and 83 percent of participants lived in places with 2,500
people or more. Most participants were single; 43 percent were never-married, and 32
percent were divorced, separated, or widowed. Participant households had 1.4 adults
and 1.7 children, and 92 percent had only one IDA participant. In this sample, 51
percent were Caucasian, 32 percent were African-American, and 18 percent were of
another race/ethnicity (mostly Asian Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans).
Of these demographic characteristics, only race/ethnicity had statistically
significant effects. People who were not Caucasian nor African-American were more
likely to continue to participate, and African-Americans had lower desired savings than
other groups. Schreiner et al. (2001) discuss this result in detail.
A.3 Education, employment, and receipt of public assistance
College graduates (24 percent of participants, Table A3) had higher desired
savings than those who went to college but did not graduate (37 percent), who
completed high school or got a General Equivalency Diploma (24 percent), or who did
not finish high school (15 percent). Education did not affect continuing participation.37
Employment status did not affect desired savings, but students and full-time
workers were more likely to exit. “Unemployed or not working” includes people laid-off
and awaiting a call-back, people seeking a job, as well as homemakers, the retired, and
the disabled. About 92 percent of IDA participants in ADD worked full-time or part-
time or were students.
About 19 percent of participants owned business assets or had self-employment
income. The self-employed were more likely to continue participation.
Data on receipt of Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), TANF,
food stamps, or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) was missing for 70 percent of
cases. A dummy marks these missing cases. Of the rest, about 43 percent had received
public assistance, with no effect on participation or desired savings.
A.4 Income, assets, and debts
A.4.1 Income
Average annual income was about $12,000. Increased income was linked with a
small increase in desired savings but not with any change in participation (Table A4). 
About three-fourths of IDA participants likely received the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), worth about $1,100 to the average recipient. Although IDA savings
spike in tax season (Schreiner et al., 2001), neither EITC receipt nor the imputed level
of the tax credit were linked with continued participation or with desired savings.38
A.4.2 Assets
About 55 percent of participants reported owning a passbook savings account at
enrollment (in addition to the IDA). Continued participation increased with account
ownership, and higher balances were associated with increased desired savings.
About 68 percent of participants owned a checking account. Ownership did not
affect participation, but higher balances were linked with higher desired savings.
About 16 percent of participants owned a home, and 72 percent owned a car.
Neither was associated with participation or savings.
A.4.3 Debts
About 62 percent of participants reported debts at enrollment, be they home
mortgages, car loans, business loans, mortgages on land or property, loans from family
or friends, credit-card debt, student loans, or overdue bills. Neither the presence of debt
nor its value was associated with continued participation or desired savings.
A.5 Other variables and regression parameters
A.5.1 Pre-IDA relationship
Some participants (40 percent, Table A5) received services from the host
organization at some point before enrollment in the IDA program. Another 22 percent
were referred to the IDA program by a partner organization. An existing relationship
with the host or a referral from a partner did not affect participation or savings.39
A.5.2 Late enrollees and multiple accounts
In the months before the ADD enrollment deadline of December 31, 1999, some
programs scrambled to meet enrollment goals. Table A5 suggests that last-minute
enrollees were more likely to exit but did not differ in terms of desired savings.
Program 6 allowed participants to have more than one account. The analysis
here aggregates the accounts as if they were a single account. Multiple accounts were
weakly associated with an increase in desired savings of about $200.40
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Table 1: Comparison of features of IDAs, 401(k) plans, and Roth IRAs
Feature IDAs 401(k) plans Roth IRAs
Eligibility Income-tested Employer that offers plan Universal (earned income, income
cut-off)
Subsidy Direct match Match (via tax break; employer
match is part of compensation) 
Match (via tax break)
Source of subsidy Government or private donor Government Government
Type of account Unrestricted-access, insured
passbook savings account in bank
Restricted-access account, often in
a mutual fund
Restricted-access account, often
in a mutual fund
Tax status After-tax deposits, earnings taxed,




distributions taxed as income
After-tax contributions, tax-free
accumulation, no tax on
retirement distributions
Penalty for early distributions None (but no match) Current taxes and excise tax Excise tax
Uses Purchase of home, post-secondary
education, or microenterprise assets
Consumption in retirement (also
pre-retirement loans and hardship
withdrawals may be allowed)
Consumption in retirement (also
allows pre-retirement home
purchase, college tuition, or
medical hardship)
Administrator/Sponsor Not-for-profit organizations Employers Financial-service organizations
Match cap Annual, set by program Annual, set by employer and/or
by law
Annual, set by law
Direct deposit Possible, but not required Obligatory Possible, but not required
Financial education Obligatory Voluntary (employer may offer) Voluntary (must be sought out)43
Table 2: Continuing participation and savings by
match rate for IDAs in ADD
Match rate
3:1 2:1 1:1 Full sample Measure
Number of participants
185 292 330 807 All
130 252 292 674 Continuing
55 40 38 133 Exits
70 86 88 84 Share continuing (%)
For continuing participants only:
314 376 411 379 Net savings ($)
1,259 1,127 823 1,021 Asset accumulation (savings + match) (
3.5 2.5 3.2 3.0 IDA savings as a share of income (%)
71 64 68 67 Share of months with a deposit (%)
31 25 37 31 Share of participants at match cap (%)
Source: Continuing participants with annual match c
           their twelfth month of participation in ADD through June 30, 200044
Table 3: Match caps across programs in ADD for
continuing versus exited participants
Exited participants Continuing participants
3:1 2:1 1:1 3:1 2:1 1:1 Program
1 9 38 50 1




1 30 1 4 73 6
8 5 63 76 7a
78 63 7b
Note: Of 807 participants, 674 continued and 133 exited.45
Table 4: Match rates across programs in ADD for
continuing versus exited participants
Exited participants Continuing participants
>=750 500 250-300 >=750 500 250-300 Program
10 88 1




8 23 1 19 54 4 6
13 139 7a
141 7b
Note: Of 807 participants, 674 continued and 133 exited.46
Table 5: Effects of match rates and match caps on
continued participation and savings
Desired savings Continuing participation
Mean p-value Beta Mean p-value Beta Variable
Match cap
6.16 0.01 -74 6.06 0.29 -0.11 Annual cap ($100s)
Match rate
0.43 0.41 1:1 (omitted)
0.37 0.02 -102 0.36 0.04 0.88 2:1
0.19 0.59 -232 0.23 0.04 2.19 3:1 or higher
Note: Tobit model for savings with selection on continued participation.
Probit marginal effects in percentage-point units are Beta·0.39947
Table A1: Program characteristics
Desired savings Continuing participatio
Mean p-value Beta Mean p-value Beta Variable
9.01 Hours of general financial ed. attended (spline)
0.05 0.02 226 (Omitted from first step) Zero
5.39 0.03 29 1 to 6
3.24 0.01 32 7 to 12
0.38 0.88 2 12 to 18 (capped at 18)
Intended use
0.49 (Omitted from first step) Home purchase (omitted)
0.18 0.80 -10 Post-secondary education
0.14 0.31 44 Self-employment
0.20 0.47 32 Other use
Program fixed effects
0.42 0.36 7a and 7b
0.13 0.01 -220 0.12 0.88 -0.08 1
0.07 0.75 139 0.13 0.01 -4.09 2
0.10 0.31 -70 0.11 0.62 -0.29 3
0.05 0.22 -106 0.04 0.60 0.45 4
0.12 0.81 101 0.10 0.15 -1.67 5
0.11 0.59 -38 0.14 0.01 -2.86 6
Note: Tobit model for savings with selection on continued participa
Probit marginal effects in percentage-point units are Beta·0.399.48
Table A2: Participant demographics
Desired savings Continuing participatio
Mean p-value Beta Mean p-value Beta Variable
Gender
0.25 0.25 Male (omitted)
0.75 0.41 27 0.75 0.18 -0.37 Female
37.2 36.1 Age (spline)
34.5 0.18 -3.3 33.7 0.37 0.02 0 to 40 years
2.8 0.30 2.8 2.4 0.16 0.06 41 years or more
Location of residence
0.81 0.83 Population of 2,500 or more (omitted)
0.19 0.36 -46 0.17 0.87 -0.08 Population less than 2,500
Marital status
0.41 0.43 Never-married (omitted)
0.26 0.51 34 0.25 0.62 0.21 Married
0.33 0.40 27.1 0.32 0.48 -0.20 Divorced, separated, or widow
3.1 3.1 Household composition
1.4 0.29 35 1.4 0.22 -0.35 Adults (18 or older)
1.7 0.35 10.9 1.7 0.97 0.004 Children (17 or younger)
Participants in household
0.92 0.92 One (omitted)
0.08 0.75 20 0.08 0.70 0.13 More than one
Race/ethnicity
0.53 0.51 Caucasian (omitted)
0.29 0.01 -108 0.32 0.39 -0.23 African-American
0.18 0.85 6.9 0.18 0.05 0.66 Other race/ethnicity
Note: Tobit model for savings with selection on continued participat
Probit marginal effects in percentage-point units are Beta·049
Table A3: Education, employment, and receipt of public assistance
Desired savings Continuing participation
Mean p-value Beta Mean p-value Beta Variable
Education
0.26 0.24 College graduate (omitted)
0.38 0.03 -67 0.37 0.94 -0.02 Attended college but did not graduate
0.23 0.01 -121 0.24 0.63 -0.15 Completed high school or earned GED
0.13 0.12 -82 0.15 0.39 -0.30 Did not complete high school
Employment
0.61 0.60 Full-time (omitted)
0.25 0.24 40 0.24 0.02 0.69 Employed part-time
0.08 0.95 -4 0.08 0.09 0.74 Unemployed or not working
0.06 0.59 -34 0.08 0.72 -0.15 Student
Self-employed
0.81 0.83 No (omitted)
0.19 0.55 19 0.17 0.05 0.79 Yes
Welfare receipt
0.16 0.17 No (omitted)
0.12 0.36 -38 0.13 0.90 -0.05 AFDC, TANF, food stamps, or SSI
0.73 0.05 76.7 0.70 0.01 0.86 Missing
Note: Tobit model for savings with selection on continued participation.
Probit marginal effects in percentage-point units are Beta·0.399.50
Table A4: Income, assets, and debts
Desired savings Continuing participation
Mean p-value Beta Mean p-value Beta Variable
Income at enrollment
4.77 0.02 29 4.78 0.80 -0.05 Annual (log of $100s)
Imputed EITC receipt
0.25 0.26 Likely did not receive (omitted)
0.75 0.50 -39 0.74 0.44 0.35 Likely did receive
2.09 0.84 4 2.07 0.55 -0.09 Value (log of $100s)
Passbook savings account
0.36 0.39 Not owned (omitted)
0.57 0.57 -18 0.55 0.10 0.39 Owned
0.07 0.37 50 0.06 0.19 -0.76 Missing
0.53 0.03 38 0.51 0.16 -0.22 Balance (log of $100s)
Checking account
0.15 0.21 Not owned (omitted)
0.74 0.48 -26 0.68 0.54 0.18 Owned
0.11 0.88 7 0.10 0.55 -0.30 Missing
0.69 0.01 72 0.63 0.68 0.08 Balance (log of $100s)
Home
0.81 0.84 Not owned (omitted)
0.19 0.26 44 0.16 0.51 0.30 Owned
Car
0.24 0.28 Not owned (omitted)
0.76 0.73 11 0.72 0.31 0.24 Owned
Debts
0.33 0.34 None (omitted)
0.64 0.69 -18 0.62 0.71 0.16 Some
0.04 0.72 23 0.04 0.57 -0.31 Missing
2.44 0.48 -7.6 2.30 0.78 0.03 Value of debt (log of $100s)
Note: Tobit model for savings with selection on continued participation.
Probit marginal effects in percentage-point units are Beta·0.399.51
Desired savings Continuing participation
Mean p-value Beta Mean p-value Beta Variable
Existing relationship with host org.
0.47 0.44 No (omitted)
0.41 0.72 -10 0.40 0.29 0.37 Yes
0.12 0.60 -33 0.16 0.28 -0.69 Missing
Referred by a partner organization
No (omitted)
0.23 0.69 12 0.22 0.91 -0.05 Yes
0.09 0.54 -56 0.13 0.01 -1.72 Missing
Enrolled after June 30, 1999
0.95 0.92 No (omitted)
0.05 0.57 -32 0.08 0.01 -1.03 Yes
Multiple accounts in one household (Program 6 only)
0.97 0.97 No (omitted)
0.03 0.17 202 0.03 0.31 0.91 Yes
Regression parameters
0.01 0.56 (Omitted from first step) Rho
1.00 0.92 20 1.00 0.23 1.84 Intercept
0.01 270 (Omitted from first step) Sigma
Note: Tobit model for savings with selection on continued participation.
Probit marginal effects in percentage-point units are Beta·0.399.
Table A5: Other variables and regression parameters